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thereof. As explained by Beecher, the contracting
process must contain a number of safeguards in order to
be protective of the interests of the principal (typically a
unit of local government), including a well-designed
process of competitive bidding, incentive-based
compensation along with measurable performance
targets, and a procedure for complying with state and
federal regulations.

PROBLEMS WITH PUBLIC OWNERSHIP AND
MANAGEMENT
Publicly owned and publicly managed water utilities are
thought to incur excessive costs of construction,
procurement, and operation; over-utilize debt and
overcapitalize; under-innovate; under-charge; and favor
politically influential groups (Beecher, 1995 and 1999).
Ironically, while environmental concerns are often cited
as a justification for public intervention, the high costs
that environmental regulations impose are often the
straw that breaks the back of public water management
(Moore, 1999). Moreover, the empirical trend towards
deregulation and privatization cannot be ignored.

The contracting model has a number of potential
problems of its own, however. The one receiving the
most attention in the sessions was the length of the
contractual relationship. Moore posits that the reason
for the empirical trend towards longer-term contracts is
efficiency. For example, long-term contracts allow
management to accommodate full employment
obligations (for the existing employees) without
substantial loss in profits. They likewise motivate
private investment and appear to lead to greater cost
savings. Beecher points out, however, that long-term
contracts diminish competition, leading to de facto
monopoly, and the cost-savings of privatization redound
to the private company not the rate-paying public.

PRIVATIZATION OPTIONS: CONTRACTING
VS. PRIVATE OWNERSHIP
There was an apparent consensus among the authors
that “privatization” is a rather vague characterization of
several institutional alternatives to public management.
Private ownership with public regulation of rates and
charges, the historical standard for other public utilities,
was not seriously considered by any of the authors.
Even industries such as electric power and
telecommunications, where the regulated natural
monopoly approach once was the norm, are being
deregulated. The two forms of privatization that are
most relevant to water and wastewater systems are
public ownership, with private management effected via
competitive contracts, and private ownership.

Because the nature of water resources and the needs of
water consumers vary across communities and because
there is not an extensive history of private water
contracting, there is not a well-developed menu of best
practices from which communities can draw when
designing contractual mechanisms suitable for their
individual situations. Those designing said contracts
face an inevitable tradeoff. If they try to specify every
possible performance measure and every contingency,
the contract will be too complex, too expensive to
design and too difficult to monitor.
If they try to
simplify the contract, the concessionaire or franchisee

Contracting for Private Management
In the contracts model, the city or state government
retains ownership of the water facilities and tenders
contracts to private companies for the management
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to serve the public interest. Regulation, in turn, brings
some of the same problems of public ownership and
management, including overcapitalization and the
politicization of the public utility.

will be motivated to stint on the unspecified and
unmeasured (or poorly measured) objectives.
A long-term partnership between local government and
a private company, as envisioned by Moore, may indeed
succeed if the local government partners with a “winwin” oriented company which believes that its longterm interests are aligned with improved and more
economical customer service.
The risk remains,
however,
that
the
company
will
behave
opportunistically instead, seeking opportunities to
exploit its insider position to “hold-up” the customers
for higher rates.

This dilemma poses another research challenge, namely
whether and how water and wastewater services can be
effectively deregulated. Direct imitation of deregulation
in the electric power and/or telecommunications sectors
is clearly not feasible. Whether a deregulation option
will emerge that is appropriate to the water sector
remains to be seen.
PUBLIC OWNERSHIP, PRIVATE EFFICIENCY

A research challenge is to find a mechanism for
exploiting the benefits of long-term partnership, while
simultaneously exploiting the discipline of competition.
One possibility is to empower an “accountability”
agency to compare the performance of private
companies across communities. Such comparisons
would not be trivial exercises. They should include not
only multiple performance characteristics but the nature
of the water resources at hand, as well as an estimate of
the “first-best” efficient solution for each situation.

Some of these reforms may be accomplished while
retaining public ownership and management. Edward
Bailey described how Colorado Springs reorganized its
water and wastewater treatment services in order to
achieve many of the same objectives of privatization. In
this model, Colorado Springs Utilities (CSU) is citizenowned and operated. CSU’s human resources are
provided by the government Water Resources
Department. While the new organization is public in
nature, it has apparently adapted an incentive system
not dissimilar from those used by long-term private
concessionaires and achieved substantial cost savings
and other efficiency gains. Moreover, its charter
provides an independence that is unlike ordinary line
agencies of government.

Another challenge is to provide an appropriate
conceptual framework for extracting normative lessons
from the contracting experiences of various
communities. Key to this endeavor would be discerning
between situations wherein the local government:
• Successfully designs company-selection and
incentive mechanisms that improve the quality of
service (including environmental standards) and
lower financial costs facing tax and rate-payers,
• Attempts to achieve the above outcomes only to find
that the private contractor has exploited its insideradvantage for higher profits and failed to achieve the
objectives, and
• Actively or passively colludes with the private
company in the pursuit of mutual gains that do not
benefit the ostensible beneficiaries of privatization.

Manning and Mason described the approach that their
management consulting teams use to effect efficiency
gains in both publicly owned and privately owned but
publicly regulated public utilities. They see both as
monopolies whose isolation from competition has led to
similar bureaucratization and stagnation of operations.
Both of these papers emphasize how a culture shift is
needed before old habits and procedures can be
discarded; they also provide details on the nature of
thought patterns that need to be changed. Some of the
discussion of these papers implicitly questioned the
transferability of this experience. Charismatic leaders
can perhaps transform public agencies. One would
think, however, that transforming the governance
structure such that the new culture and thinking are
effectively incentivized would have a greater chance of
success.

Instances of this category include the exploitation of
perverse tax laws (see below) and the use of the
contracting mechanism to exploit implicit loopholes in
the public-utility regulatory commissions of many states
(Beecher).
Private Ownership

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
One solution to the agency problems discussed above is
to unify the principal (owner) and agent (contractor)
through private ownership. This solution creates the
need for increased regulation, however, because the
owner is a monopolist and does not automatically seek

Privatization is not a panacea that can instantly cure the
myriad inefficiencies of public ownership and
management. First of all, privatization could take many
forms. Secondly, the two most popular forms of
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research in environmental economics, economic
development policy, and agricultural economics. Many
of his recent publications have dealt with water issues,
including the design of institutions for water
management

privatizing water systems – contracting and private
ownership – have a number of potential disadvantages.
Nonetheless, the inefficiencies of the traditional
publicly-owned-and-managed approach to water system
organization are large and compelling enough that the
current restructuring trend is expected to continue.
There is neither adequate theory nor evidence to resolve
the question of whether restructuring should or will take
the form of private ownership, whether incentive
compatible contract mechanisms can be devised to
render public ownership/private management a superior
organizational form, or whether a leaner and more
efficient incentive structure can adequately improve on
public management to make it the dominant approach.
It appears that different communities will continue to
opt for different approaches to increased efficiency
according to their different economic and political
circumstances.
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To some extent the long-term-contract organizational
form, with ownership staying with a unit of local
government, is emerging as the preeminent type of
privatization in the water industry. This contrasts
starkly with the movement in other public utilities
towards private ownership with competition provided
by deregulation. There are two apparent reasons why
this movement has not taken off in the water industry.
First, perverse tax laws penalize private ownership.
Second, the technological nature of the water industry
may be resistant to competition through deregulation.
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Among the policy conclusions and recommendations to
emerge from this apparent contrast is to reform the tax
laws that may be inhibiting the evolution of private
ownership. In addition, increased understanding is
needed of whether technological idiosyncrasies of the
water industry account for the apparent failure of the
deregulation movement so prominent in electric power
and telecommunications. To the extent that competition
among water service providers in a single market is not
technologically desirable, alternative mechanisms of
providing competition are needed.
One such
institutional innovation would be to develop a
federation
among
communities
whereby
the
performance of various water-service providers could be
compared. This would induce competition among
providers to enhance their performance ratings both to
retain their existing contracts and to obtain contracts in
new markets.
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